"Constructive Ambiguity" Requires China's Good Faith
By Wu Chien-chung
China Times, March 20, 2021
Regarding cross-strait exchanges, Minister Chiu Tai-san of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) stated that the two sides interpret the "1992 Consensus" differently. Whether the two sides can find the greatest common denominator and a "constructive ambiguity" depends on the wisdom and attitude of both sides. Minister of National Defense Chiu Guo-cheng also bluntly said that our own country will be saved by ourselves, "If the enemy wants a fight, we will fight as long as the enemy wants."
The people are certainly happy to see civilian officials advocating peace, and the defense chief showing great valor in defending their homeland and country. The tone of Chiu's remark this time was very soft, just like the last time he likened resuming cross-strait exchanges to " blossoms in spring." According to observers, Chiu's proposal of "constructive ambiguity" at this moment is a meaningful first step to facilitate cross-strait dialogue.
Mainland Chinese official media also believes that Chiu’s remarks signal a willingness to talk. The chance of breaking the ice across the strait seems to be greater, but the key issue is still unresolved.
The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has tried to circumvent the "1992 Consensus," so Chiu hopes to use "constructive ambiguity" to start constructive interaction and exchanges between the two sides of the strait, but this is not in line with Beijing's prerequisite for the resumption of cross-strait dialogue.
This is the first time that the MAC has put forward a "constructive ambiguity" statement. In fact, the "1992 Consensus" coined by Su Chi, former minister of the MAC, was originally a kind of ambiguity. The KMT trumpeted "One China, with respective interpretations," but mainland China only stated from the beginning "one China" and mum on the different interpretation.
As we already know, the semantic connotation of the "1992 Consensus" is that Beijing advocates that the two sides of the strait adhere to the one-China principle in their own way of expression. In other words, it is fine with China so long as there is some acknowledgment of one China, no matter what the consensus. The KMT maintains that the connotation of the one-China principle should be allowed to be interpreted by each side. This is a kind of ambiguity. It turns out that both the KMT and the Communist Party are relatively satisfied, and they can explain it internally and externally.
The irony is that our government keeps stressing the Republic of China, but the mainland has turned a deaf ear to it. Beijing's version of the "1992 Consensus" becomes a unilateral mainland claim. This kind of narrative devoid of the R.O.C. is difficult for ordinary Taiwanese to accept. Even Chairman Johnny Chiang of the KMT feels pressured, causing further disarray within the KMT.
The key point here is how will Beijing respond to the "constructive ambiguity" raised by the administration of President Tsai Ing-wen? For the mainland, the "1992 Consensus" has been included in the political report of the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. How could it be obscure and ambiguous?
The author believes that if Beijing also hopes to break the cross-strait deadlock, one way is for the mainland to retreat to the KMT's position and allow interpretation by each side. The second is to adjust the policy, taking the opportunity of "constructive ambiguity" proposed by the Tsai administration. President Tsai has said that she respects the historical fact that in 1992, the two institutions representing each side across the strait, in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences, through communications and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgments and understandings. So there is still room for both sides to step back.
Despite Beijing's readiness for applying integrated development and armed intimidation dual tactics and difficulty to retreat to this point, historical experience shows that Beijing's policy flip-flop is not impossible.
After U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's secret visit to mainland China, didn't the Communists completely turn around? Isn't the "1992 Consensus" circumventing "One China"? The KMT and the Communist Party have been entangled with "One China" for 50 years, and then the "1992 Consensus" emerged, which circumvented the "One China" problem. At present, the two sides of the strait have been entangled by the "1992 Consensus." "In order to untie the bell, the person who tied it is required." If Beijing can untangle it again, cross-strait relations may begin anew.
The author is associate professor at Taipei University of Marine Technology.
From: https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20210320000601-260109